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PROJECT CHECO REPORTS
The counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare environment of Southeast Asia has resulted in USAF airpower being employed to meet a multitude of requirements. These varied applications have involved the full spectrum of USAF aerospace vehicles, support equipment, and manpower. As a result, operational data and eXperiences have accumulated which should be collected, documented, and analyzed for current and future impact upon USAF.policies, concepts, and doctrine.
Fortunately, the value of collecting and documenting our SEA experiences was recognized at an early date. In 1962, Hq USAF directed CINCPACAF to establish an activity which would provide timely and analytical studies' of USAF combat operations in SEA and would be primarily responsive to Air Staff requirements and direction.
Project CHECO, an acronym for Cont~~orary Historical Examination of Current Operations, was established to meet the Air Staff directive. Based on the policy guidance of the Office of Air Force History and managed by IIq PACAF, with elements in Southeast Asia, Project CHECO provides a scholarly "on-going" historical examination, documentation, and reporting on USAF policies, concepts, and doctrine in PACQM; This CUECO report is part of the overall docllll1l!ntation and examination which is being accOftlplhhed. It is an authentic source for an assessment of the effectiveness of USAF airpower in PACOM when used in proper context. The reader must view the study 1n relation to the events· and circumstances at the time of Hs preparation--recognizing that it was prepared on a contemporary basis which restricted perspective and that the author's research was limited to records available within his local headquarters area. Cambodia are detailed in this report, along with a statistical summary of airlift operations. :
The flexible operating capability of the Tactical Air Control System met the requirements of the Cambodian operations with routine efficiency.
Even though Seventh Air Force received instructions to begin definitive planning only two days before the ARVN entry into the Parrot's Beak, all tactical air assets were ready on schedule. Forward air controllers and fighter pilots followed normal in-country Rules of Engagement and operating procedures, exercising special care to avoid dropping ordnance on the noncombatant populace.
Because intelligence estimates indicated that heavy enemy resistance could be anticipated, extensive airstrikes were used to suppress enemy resistance prior to combat assaults. Both preplanned and immediate airstrikes supported operations on the ground. Many preplanned airstrikes were diverted from the preplanned targets to support troops in contact and to hit significant targets of opportunity. After the initial assaults, ground forces turned to searching the areas for supplies and evacuating the caches discovered. During this phase, airstrikes were preplanned to furnish air cover and to aid in the discovery and destruction of storage areas.
Although approval for use of Thailand-based forces was received. Except for some initial heavy contacts in a few areas, the entire ground campaign VI:lS characterized by contacts with scattered enemy units.
The retreat of the mai n enemy forces into the i nteri or of Cambodi a a 11 owed friendly ground forces to sweep through the base areas with 1,147 killed in action, compared to 11,562 enemy losses. These odds would likely have been much less favorable had tactical air not been available to coerce the enemy from ~is fortified defenses. The threat as well as the employment xii ,TOP liCeE' Hak Ly Company, a VC/NVA front, trucked supplies from the port via Highw!'y 4 to Karr,oong Speu, where they were stored in two logistic depots.
One of the depots was operated by the VC/NVA and the other by the Cambodian army compound at Lovek, northwest of Phnom Penh. The goods were reshipped from the depots on Hak Ly trucks over Cambodia's all-weather road network directly to base areas alongside key infiltration points on the RVN Border (Fig. 3) . By 1969, these areas served not only as logistical bases but also as training areas. rest and relaxation camps, hospitals, infiltration camps, and tactical jump-off points for attacks in III and IV CTZs.
The presence of large VC/NVA forces estimated at 40,000 by Gen. Lon While Sihanouk had granted Lon Nol and Matak a strong mandate to solve the domestic problems, he considered the VC/NVAto fall in the realm of foreign policy, which he intended to control himself. Tension also grew
over the involvement of Sihanouk's fifth and then recognized wife.
Monique. her mother. and half-brother in selling protection. weapons.
and land rights to the VC/NVA and in smuggling gold, jewels, and drugs.
These activities undermined Matak's efforts to stop smuggling and to control the VC/NVA.
Despite these growing tenSions, on 6 January 1970, Sihanouk departed -----.---.---.
